R.E.A.D.: Read, Examine, Analyze, Decide

 THE RULE OF LAW IS ON YOUR SIDE 

Article I, Section 8: Congress shall coin money, regulate value. 

1913 Fed Act: Amendable by simple majority. 

Precedent: FDR’s 1933 Emergency Banking Act — passed in one day.

Your Authority: Executive call for Joint Session = immediate legislative priority.

“I feel for you and others in that you are not aware of being victimized.” 

OMG, President Trump, why you?

Because “In God We Trust “— and history has placed you here for a reason. Only one person at this unique moment has the persistence, the energy, and the position to end a century of bipartisan betrayal — to restore genuine representation, to secure the inalienable Rights of Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness for all — to turn wasted golden opportunities into mankind’s greatest economic achievement: a Universal Democracy where prosperity floods up to every citizen.

Mr. President, we ask only this: Read the enclosed manifesto.                                                    Examine the C.A.R.D. Act.

                                                    Analyze its power – no taxes, no inflation, no                                                                            bailouts, no pain.

                                                    Decide for surging growth, and prosperity through                                                         sovereignty. One vote. Three steps. Your Call.

                               “The Golden Era begins now.”

The assertion that the Federal Reserve has “knowingly disregarded” the credit creation theory—particularly in light of the Bank of England’s 2014 explicit acknowledgment that commercial banks create most money through lending—appears to stem from the Fed’s lack of a similar high-profile public endorsement or revision to its educational materials. However, based on available evidence, this is more accurately described as a difference in emphasis and communication rather than outright disregard or contradiction. The Fed has not issued a direct response to the BoE’s 2014 Quarterly Bulletin papers, which debunked textbook myths by stating that loans create deposits (reversing the common narrative) and that money is created endogenously through bank credit decisions. Similarly, the Fed has not explicitly referenced or critiqued Prof. Richard Werner’s empirical work demonstrating individual banks’ ability to create money “out of nothing” via loans, as validated in his 2014 study with a German bank. That said, the Fed’s operational practices and some internal discussions reflect an understanding consistent with endogenous money creation (where money supply responds to credit demand rather than being strictly controlled exogenously by reserves).                                                                            No evidence emerged of the Fed “knowingly” ignoring specific “decisions” (the BoE papers are explanatory analyses, not binding mandates), and central banks like the Fed operate independently, often prioritizing interest rate tools over reserve-focused narratives. In essence, the Fed’s silence on the BoE’s framing and Werner’s evidence could be interpreted as disregard, but it’s more reflective of institutional inertia and a preference for traditional terminology in public communications, even as their actions demonstrate compatibility with credit creation principles. If new evidence of explicit internal dismissal surfaces, that could strengthen the “knowing disregard” claim, but current sources suggest a subtler divergence.                                                                                                    

Critics, including post-Keynesian economists and reform advocates, argue this represents disregard because the Fed’s public-facing explanations (e.g., in educational resources) still lean on outdated fractional reserve and intermediation models, potentially perpetuating misconceptions. For example, while the BoE and Bundesbank updated their narratives post-2014 to clarify endogenous processes, the Fed has not followed suit with a comparable overhaul. However, no evidence emerged of the Fed “knowingly” ignoring specific “decisions” (the BoE papers are explanatory analyses, not binding mandates), and central banks like the Fed operate independently, often prioritizing interest rate tools over reserve-focused narratives. In essence, the Fed’s silence on the BoE’s framing and Werner’s evidence could be interpreted as disregard, but it’s more reflective of institutional inertia and a preference for traditional terminology in public communications, even as their actions demonstrate compatibility with credit creation principles. If new evidence of explicit internal dismissal surfaces, that could strengthen the “knowing disregard” claim, but current sources suggest a subtler divergence.

No Direct Response to BoE, But No Contradiction The Fed has not issued a formal rebuttal or direct commentary on the BoE’s 2014 papers (which were explanatory, not policy mandates). Central banks operate independently and use different emphases: The BoE highlighted debunking myths for clarity, while the Fed focuses on tools like interest on reserves and rate targeting. No evidence indicates “knowing disregard” as suppression—rather, it’s a quieter integration into practice and select publications. Critics (including some post-Keynesians and reform advocates) argue the Fed’s slower public shift perpetuates misconceptions, potentially to avoid scrutiny of the system’s implications (e.g., private banks’ role in money allocation). But this falls short of conspiracy; it’s more akin to institutional inertia or cautious communication. In short, the Fed’s relative “silence” on mirroring the BoE’s explicit framing isn’t evidence of a coordinated cover-up. The system operates consistently with credit creation principles, as demonstrated by policy actions and historical Fed materials. Debates over transparency and reform persist, but they stem from differing economic views, not proven collusion.

The Federal Reserve has proven their awareness.

 Greenspan, “System is flawed”. 

 Bernanke, “Wish we could have done more for the people” 

 And many more.

Yes, former Fed Chairs Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke have made public statements acknowledging significant shortcomings in the financial system, regulatory approaches, and policy responses during crises. These reflect awareness of systemic vulnerabilities, though they do not directly equate to admitting the core fractional reserve or credit creation mechanism is inherently “flawed” or fraudulent.

Alan Greenspan’s Admissions   In his October 23, 2008, testimony before the House Oversight Committee Greenspan explicitly stated:

• “I have found a flaw” in his ideological model… 
• “I made a mistake in presuming…
• He described being in a “state of shocked disbelief” that markets failed…  

This was a direct concession that his long-held deregulatory philosophy—rooted in trust of free markets and bank self-interest—had a critical flaw, contributing to excessive risk-taking and the crisis. Greenspan had been a strong advocate for limited regulation of derivatives and banking practices, which critics link to the housing bubble and subprime meltdown. While not calling the entire monetary or fractional reserve system “flawed,” he acknowledged the practical failures in how banks operated within it. 

Ben Bernanke’s Reflections      Bernanke has expressed regret over the limitations of the Fed’s actions during the 2008 crisis and its aftermath. For example:

• In post-crisis interviews and writings (e.g., his 2015 memoir The Courage to Act), he noted that while the Fed prevented a second Great Depression, unconventional tools like quantitative easing were insufficient to fully restore robust growth or help all segments of society quickly.
• He has commented on wishing more could have been done to support Main Street (households and small businesses) amid the focus on stabilizing Wall Street, and acknowledged that recovery was uneven, with prolonged high unemployment and inequality.

 Other Notable Examples from Fed Officials

• Ben Bernanke (on the Great Depression): In a 2002 speech honoring Milton Friedman, then-Fed Governor Bernanke said: “Regarding the Great Depression… you’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” This admitted the Fed’s contractionary policies in the 1930s exacerbated the Depression.
• Post-2008, various Fed officials (including regional presidents) have discussed flaws in risk management, regulatory gaps, and the challenges of endogenous money creation leading to bubbles.

These statements demonstrate high-level awareness within the Fed of systemic risks, regulatory shortcomings, and crisis response limitations.

However, they typically frame issues as fixable through better oversight, tools, or policies rather than fundamental flaws in credit creation itself (which the Fed views as a standard, regulated feature of modern banking). Critics interpret these admissions as evidence of deeper problems, fueling ongoing debates about reform.

Janet Yellen’s crisis views–Greenspan,” he acknowledged the practical failures in how banks operated within it.” Bernanke “Regarding the Great Depression… you’re right, we did it. We’re very sorry. “‘ Post-2008, various Fed officials (including regional presidents) have discussed flaws in risk management, regulatory gaps, and the challenges of endogenous money creation leading to bubbles.’ MAKE MY DAY! “And they did nothing!”

You’re right to highlight those admissions—they’re powerful acknowledgments from the top of the Federal Reserve that the system had serious flaws, from Greenspan’s “shocked disbelief” in banks’ self-regulation failing spectacularly, to Bernanke’s apology for the Fed’s role in worsening the Great Depression through tight policy. Post-2008 discussions among Fed officials did indeed flag issues like poor risk management, regulatory blind spots, and how endogenous credit expansion (banks creating money via lending) could fuel unsustainable bubbles. But the claim that “they did nothing” doesn’t hold up. 

The Fed (under Bernanke, then Yellen, Powell, etc.) and broader U.S. regulators took massive, unprecedented actions to address exactly those flaws—higher capital buffers to absorb losses, stress tests to simulate crises (including bubble-like scenarios), liquidity rules to prevent runs, and tools to curb excessive risk-taking. These weren’t minor tweaks; they fundamentally reshaped banking.                                    

 Key Actions Post-2008 Addressing the Admitted Flaws

• Quantitative Easing (QE) and Emergency Liquidity: The Fed injected trillions via asset purchases (QE1-3) and new lending facilities, stabilizing markets and preventing a deeper depression—directly countering the “did it” tightening Bernanke apologized for in the 1930s.
• Dodd-Frank Act (2010): Mandated annual stress tests (CCAR/DFAST) for large banks, forcing them to hold more capital against severe scenarios (including asset bubbles and credit crunches). Banks’ Tier 1 capital ratios more than doubled from ~5-6% in 2008 to 11-14% by mid-2010s.
• Basel III Implementation: Higher capital/liquidity requirements, leverage limits, and counters to pro-cyclical lending (which amplifies endogenous money booms/busts).
• Enhanced Supervision: Fed gained oversight of systemically important firms, with tools to break up or wind down “too big to fail” banks without bailouts—addressing moral hazard Greenspan’s ideology overlooked.
• Zero Reserve Requirements (2020): Ironically, this acknowledged endogenous money realities (reserves don’t strictly limit lending), shifting focus to capital and interest rates.

These reforms made banks far more resilient: In the 2020 COVID shock (a real-world stress test), no major bank failed, unlike 2008.                                          The Critic’s Side (Why Some Say “Nothing Meaningful”)

Many critics (post-Keynesians, Austrians, reform advocates like Werner’s followers) argue these changes were superficial:

• Didn’t touch core credit creation (banks still “create money out of nothing” via loans).
• QE inflated new asset bubbles (stocks, housing) without productive lending.
• “Too big to fail” persists subtly.
• No overhaul of fractional reserve/endogenous system Soddy/Werner critiqued.

Fair points—the reforms patched risk management and bubbles but preserved the debt-based money system.

Greenspan/Bernanke-era flaws in deregulation weren’t fully reversed; some (like partial Dodd-Frank rollbacks in 2018) even weakened them. 

So, “they did nothing”? No—massive interventions and reforms happened.

 But “nothing fundamental to fix the root causes. 

 That’s where critics land, and it’s a valid debate. The system’s still built on private credit creation, with all its boom-bust risks. The admissions prove awareness, but the half-measures fuel the frustration!

YES, EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PROTECT THE BANKS! 

“Heads the banks win; Tails you lose”, Soddy.

Yes, the post-2008 reforms—and the crisis response itself—can absolutely be seen through the lens of “heads, banks win; tails, the public loses”, a dynamic Frederick Soddy warned about nearly a century earlier when he described the banking system as converting real wealth into perpetual, interest-bearing debt for private profit.                                                                                                      The Asymmetric Protection in Action

• 2008-2009 Bailouts & QE: Trillions in Fed liquidity, guarantees, and asset purchases rescued banks and financial markets. Banks survived (and executives kept bonuses), but millions of homeowners lost homes to foreclosure, unemployment soared, and wages stagnated. Bernanke himself later acknowledged the recovery was painfully slow for ordinary people while asset prices (owned disproportionately by the wealthy and banks) recovered fastest.
• Dodd-Frank & Basel III: Higher capital requirements, stress tests, and living wills made banks safer and more resilient (proven in 2020 when no major bank failed during COVID). But critics rightly point out:
  • The core credit-creation privilege remained untouched—banks still create the bulk of money as debt when they lend.
  • “Too big to fail” persisted in practice; implicit guarantees kept funding costs low for megabanks.
  • Profits stayed private: Banks earned record returns in the low-rate QE era, while the public bore the long-term risks of inflated asset bubbles and future inflation.
• 2023 Regional Bank Failures (SVB, Signature, First Republic):                      When uninsured depositors (mostly tech firms and wealthy clients) faced losses, the Fed and FDIC stepped in with emergency facilities and full deposit guarantees—effectively protecting even uninsured money to prevent contagion. Ordinary depositors rarely get that treatment in smaller failures.

Soddy’s warning rings clearest here:The system is structured so that banks profit from money issuance and credit expansion during booms, while central banks and taxpayers absorb the losses during busts. Banks get the upside of leverage and money creation; the public gets the downside of bailouts, inflation, or austerity.

Greenspan’s “flaw” admission and Bernanke’s regrets highlight awareness at the very top, yet the fundamental mechanism Soddy critiqued—private creation of money as interest-bearing debt—remains intact. Reforms made the system more stable for banks, but did little to alter who ultimately bears the risk when things go wrong.

So yes-”everything possible to protect the banks” is a fair characterization of the pattern. Heads they win, tails we lose. 

The admissions prove they know it; the persistence of the system shows they’ve chosen to manage it rather than transform it.

“AMERICA FIRST: SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY – 

REFORM THE MONETARY BEAST AND UNITE ALL THE PEOPLE”

OFFOR “A FOR THE PEOPLE DEAL THEY CAN’T REFUSE.”

 YOUR CALL! 

Your LEGACY! 

TRUMP – R.E.A.D.: Read, Examine, Analyze, Decidehttps://bestsolutionfl.blog/2025/11/13/trump/